The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report


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Here is the final report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission into the causes of the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. Two thorough Dissenting Statements accompany the final report. The report is a chronological compendium of the review of millions of pages of documents, the interviews of hundreds of leaders, CxOs, financial experts and academics, as well as common people, home- and business-owners who were also significantly affected by the financial meltdown. - Summary by Mario Pineda

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Preface 8:03 Leído por Joanne Turner
Conclusions of the Commission 38:05 Leído por Joanne Turner
Conclusions of the Commission, concluded 22:59 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 1 38:26 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 2 45:54 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 3 17:57 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 2. Shadow Banking: Commercial Paper and Repos 30:09 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 2. Shadow Banking: The Savings and Loan Crisis 18:16 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 20:26 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: Structured Finance 12:11 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: The Growth of Derivatives 25:53 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Expansion of Banking Activities 19:24 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Long-Term Capital Management 12:00 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Dot-Com Crash 12:11 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: The Wages of Finance 13:26 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Financial Sector Growth 8:47 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Mortgage Securitization 17:04 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Greater Access to Lending 6:19 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Subprime Lenders in Turmoil 5:33 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: The Regulators 19:20 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 6. Credit Expansion: Housing, A Powerful Stabilizing Force 19:39 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 6. Credit Expansion: Subprime Loans, Buyers Will Pay A Premium 18:12 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Citigroup: Invited Regulatory Scrutiny 4:42 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Federal Rules: Intended to Curb Unfair or Abusive Lending 12:52 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. States: Long-Standing Position 4:02 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Community-Lending Pledges: What We Do Is Reaffirm Our Intention" 10:44 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Bank Capital Standards: "Arbitrage" 5:45 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 6. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 6 1:18 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. An Irresistible Profit Opportunity 10:21 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Mortgages: A Good Loan 32:56 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Federal Regulators: Immunity from Many State Laws is a Significant Benefit 6:49 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Wall Street Was Very Hungry For Our Product 17:23 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Moody's: Given A Blank Check 16:09 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Less Competition in the Marketplace 13:09 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 7 3:24 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 8. The CDO Machine 7:50 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 8. We Created the Investor 22:21 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 8. Bear Stearns' Hedge Funds: It Functioned Fine Up Until One Day It Just Didn't Function 10:33 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 8. Citigroup's Liquidity puts: A Potential Conflict of Interest 10:51 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 8. AIG:Golden Goose for the Entire Street 10:28 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 8. Goldman Sachs: Multiplied the Effects of the Collapse in Subprime 17:16 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 8. Moody's: Achieved Through Some Alchemy 18:33 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 8. SEC: It's Going to be an Awfully Big Mess 19:27 Leído por Joanne Turner
Commission Conclusions on Chapter 8 2:55 Leído por Joanne Turner
Chapter 9. The Bubble, "A Credit-induced Boom" 15:00 Leído por Joanne Turner
Mortgage Fraud: Crime-facilitative environments 22:31 Leído por Joanne Turner
Disclosure and due diligence: A Quality Control Issue in the Factory 24:27 Leído por Joanne Turner
Regulators: markets will always self-correct 14:56 Leído por Joanne Turner
Leveraged Loans and Commercial Real Estate: You've Got to Get Up and Dance 11:08 Leído por Joanne Turner
Lehman: From Moving to Storage 7:47 Leído por Joanne Turner
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Two Stark Choices 11:36 Leído por Joanne Turner
2006: Increase Our Penetration into Subprime. 2007: Moving deeper into the credit pool 12:30 Leído por Joanne Turner
Affordable housing goals: "GSEs cried bloody murder forever." The impact of the goals 17:05 Leído por Joanne Turner
Commission Conclusions on Chapter 9 1:39 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 10. CDO Managers: "We Are Not A Rent-A-Manager" 9:52 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 10. Credit Default Swaps: "Dumb Question" 24:17 Leído por Joanne Turner
Citigroup: "I Do Not Believe We Were Powerless" 18:04 Leído por Joanne Turner
AIG: "I'm Not Getting Paid Enough to Stand on These Tracks" 8:42 Leído por Joanne Turner
Merrill Lynch: "Whatever It Takes" 12:28 Leído por Joanne Turner
Regulators: "Are Undue Concentrations of Risk Developing?" 7:29 Leído por Joanne Turner
Moody's: "It Was All About Revenue" 23:34 Leído por Joanne Turner
Commission Conclusions on Chapter 10 2:20 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 11. The Bust. Delinquencies: "The Turn of the Housing Market" 29:56 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 11. Rating Downgrades: "Never Before" 8:04 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 11. CDOs: "Climbing the Wall of Subprime Lending" 4:50 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 11. Legal Remedies: "On the Basis of the Information" 10:10 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 11. Losses: "Who Owns Residential Credit Risk?" 13:22 Leído por Joanne Turner
Commission Conclusions on Ch. 11 2:33 Leído por Joanne Turner
Early 2007: Spreading Subprime Worries 7:02 Leído por Joanne Turner
Ch. 12. Goldman: Let's be Aggressive 13:59 Leído por Joanne Turner
Bear Stearns's Hedge Funds 16:01 Leído por Joanne Turner
Rating Agencies 4:27 Leído por Joanne Turner
AIG: Well Bigger 7:39 Leído por Joanne Turner
Commission Conclusions on Ch. 12 0:56 Leído por Joanne Turner
Chapter 13 Summer 2007: Disruptions in Funding Intro 2:06 Leído por Cbteddy
Ch 13 IKB of Germany "Real Money Investors" 5:42 Leído por Cbteddy
Ch 13 Countrywide: "That's our 9/11" 8:29 Leído por Cbteddy
Ch 13 BNP Paribas: "The ringing of the bells" 4:40 Leído por Cbteddy
Ch 13 SIVs: "An Oasis of Calm" 4:04 Leído por Cbteddy
Ch 13 Money funds and other investors: "Drink[ing] from a fire hose" 6:19 Leído por Cbteddy
Commission conclusions on Chapter 13 1:39 Leído por Cbteddy
Chapter 14 Late 2007 to early 2008: Billions in subprime losses (Intro) 2:42 Leído por mpinedag
Ch 14 Merrill Lynch: "Dawining awareness over the course of the summer" 11:50 Leído por mpinedag
Ch 14 Citigroup: "That would not in any way have excited my attention" 22:26 Leído por mpinedag
Ch 14 AIG's dispute with Goldman: "There could never be losses" 32:30 Leído por mpinedag
Ch 14 Federal Reserve: "The discount window wasn't working" 7:47 Leído por mpinedag
Ch 14 Monoline Insurers: "We never expected losses" 9:16 Leído por mpinedag
Commission Conclusions on Chapter 14 1:15 Leído por mpinedag
Chapter 15 March 2008: The fall of Bear Stearns (Intro) 3:48 Leído por Cbteddy
Ch 15 "I requested some forbearance" 4:06 Leído por Cbteddy
Ch 15 "We were suitably skeptical" 3:56 Leído por Cbteddy
Ch 15 "Turn into a death spiral" 9:15 Leído por Cbteddy
Ch 15 "Duty to protect their investors" 11:06 Leído por Cbteddy
Ch 15 "The Government would not permit a higher number" 4:42 Leído por Cbteddy
Ch 15 "It was heading to a black hole" 2:49 Leído por Cbteddy
Commission Conclusions on Chapter 15 1:16 Leído por Cbteddy
Chapter 16 March to August 2008: Systemic Risk Concerns (Intro) 2:38 Leído por mpinedag
Ch 16 The Federal Reserve: "When people got scared" 8:36 Leído por mpinedag
Ch 16 JP Morgan: "Refusing to unwind...would be unforgiveable" 5:16 Leído por mpinedag
Ch 16 The Fed and the SEC: "Weak liquidity position" 7:39 Leído por mpinedag
Ch 16 Derivatives: "Early stages of assessing the potential systemic risk" 7:12 Leído por mpinedag
Ch 16 Banks: "The markets were really, really dicey" 26:35 Leído por mpinedag
Commission Conclusions on Chapter 16 1:19 Leído por mpinedag
Chapter 17 September 2008: The takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Intro) 3:28 Leído por Cbteddy
Ch 17 "A good time to buy" 5:04 Leído por Cbteddy
Ch 17 "The only game in town" 3:30 Leído por Cbteddy
Ch 17 "It's a time game...be cool" 6:38 Leído por Cbteddy
Ch 17 "The idea strikes me as perverse" 3:58 Leído por Cbteddy
Ch 17 "It will increase confidence" 8:45 Leído por Cbteddy
Ch 17 "Critical unsafe and unsound practices" 6:22 Leído por Cbteddy
Ch 17 "They went from zero to three with no warning in between" 7:31 Leído por Cbteddy
Ch 17 "The worst-run financial institution" 3:37 Leído por Cbteddy
Ch 17 "Wasn't done at my pay grade" 1:16 Leído por Cbteddy
Commission Conclusions on Chapter 17 2:26 Leído por Cbteddy
Chapter 18 September 2008: The bankruptcy of Lehman (Intro) 4:37 Leído por mpinedag
Ch 18 "Get more conservatively funded" 7:17 Leído por mpinedag
Ch 18 "This is not sounding good at all" 3:38 Leído por mpinedag
Ch 18 "Spook the market" 11:07 Leído por mpinedag
Ch 18 "Imagination hat" 8:19 Leído por mpinedag
Ch 18 "Heads of family" 3:38 Leído por mpinedag
Ch 18 "Tell those sons of bitches to unwind" 3:20 Leído por mpinedag
Ch 18 "This doesn't seem like it is going to end pretty" 8:02 Leído por mpinedag
Ch 18 "The only alternative was that Lehman had to fail" 3:48 Leído por mpinedag
Ch 18 "A calamity" 12:42 Leído por mpinedag
Commission Conclusions on Chapter 18 2:30 Leído por mpinedag
Chapter 19 September 2008: The bailout of AIG (Intro) 5:14 Leído por Cbteddy
Ch 19 "Current liquidity position is precarious" 6:56 Leído por Cbteddy
Ch 19 "Spillover effect" 10:50 Leído por Cbteddy
Ch 19 "Like a gnat on an elephant" 5:18 Leído por Cbteddy
Commission Conclusions on Chapter 19 3:07 Leído por Cbteddy
Chapter 20 Crisis and Panic (Intro) 7:45 Leído por mpinedag
Ch 20 Money market funds: "Dealers weren't even picking up their phones" 10:36 Leído por mpinedag
Ch 20 Morgan Stanley: "Now we're the next in line" 13:07 Leído por mpinedag
Ch 20 Over-the-counter derivatives "A grinding halt" 6:26 Leído por mpinedag
Ch 20 Washington Mutual "It's yours" 4:16 Leído por mpinedag
Ch 20 Wachovia "At the front end of teh dominoes as other dominoes fell" 18:26 Leído por mpinedag
Ch 20 TARP "Comprehensive approach" 18:03 Leído por mpinedag
Ch 20 AIG "We needed to stop the sucking chest wound in this patient" 10:19 Leído por mpinedag
Ch 20 Citigroup "Let the world know we will not pull a Lehman" 11:15 Leído por mpinedag
Ch 20 Bank of America "A shotgun wedding" 13:17 Leído por mpinedag
Commission Conclusions on Chapter 20 2:45 Leído por mpinedag
Chapter 21 The Economic Fallout (Intro) 4:17 Leído por Cbteddy
Ch 21 Households "I'm not eating, I'm not sleeping" 12:15 Leído por Cbteddy
Ch 21 Businesses "Squirrels storing nuts" 9:54 Leído por Cbteddy
Ch 21 Commercial real estate: "Nothing's moving" 5:09 Leído por Cbteddy
Ch 21 Government: "State struggled to close shortfalls" 8:06 Leído por Cbteddy
Ch 21 The financial sector: "Almost triple the level of three years earlier" 3:18 Leído por Cbteddy
Ch 22 Foreclosures on the rise: "Hard to talk about any recovery" 6:39 Leído por mpinedag
Ch 22 Initiatives to stem foreclosures "Persistently disregard" 6:37 Leído por mpinedag
Ch 22 Flaws in the process: "Speculation and worst-case scenarios" 5:39 Leído por mpinedag
Ch 22 Neighborhood effects: "I'm not leaving" 5:26 Leído por mpinedag
Commission Conclusions on Chapter 22 1:01 Leído por mpinedag
Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Intro 1:19 Leído por Cbteddy
Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - How our approach differs from others? 7:09 Leído por Cbteddy
Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Stages of the crisis 2:26 Leído por Cbteddy
Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The ten essential causes of the financial and economic crisis 6:10 Leído por Cbteddy
Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The credit bubble: global capita flows, underpriced risk, and Federal Reserve policy 8:30 Leído por Cbteddy
Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The housing bubble 8:35 Leído por Cbteddy
Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Turning bad mortgages into toxic financial assets 7:28 Leído por Cbteddy
Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Big bank bets and why banks failed 9:32 Leído por Cbteddy
Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Two types of systemic failure 13:52 Leído por Cbteddy
Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The shock and panic 6:39 Leído por Cbteddy
Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The system freezing 3:50 Leído por Cbteddy
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - Intro 23:30 Leído por mpinedag
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - Summary 7:41 Leído por mpinedag
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 1. Government policies resulted in an unprecedented number of risky mortgages 15:59 Leído por mpinedag
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 2. The great housing bubble and its effects 13:03 Leído por mpinedag
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 3. Delinquency rates on nontraditional mortgages 4:20 Leído por mpinedag
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 4. The origin and growth of subprime PMBS 7:58 Leído por mpinedag
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 5. What was known about NTMs prior to the crisis? 17:17 Leído por mpinedag
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 6. Conclusion 4:40 Leído por mpinedag
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - Intro 3:26 Leído por Cbteddy
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - How failures among NTMs were transmitted to the financial system 3:21 Leído por Cbteddy
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - The defaults begin 34:12 Leído por Cbteddy
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - Intro 9:00 Leído por Cbteddy
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 1. HUD's central role 7:34 Leído por Cbteddy
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 2. The decline of mortgage underwriting standards 35:58 Leído por Cbteddy
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 3. The affordable housing goals were the sole reason that the GSEs' acquired so many NTMs, part 1 27:41 Leído por mpinedag
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 3. The affordable housing goals were the sole reason that the GSEs' acquired so many NTMs, part 2 28:32 Leído por mpinedag
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 4. Competition between the GSEs and FHA for subprime and alt-a mortgages 10:15 Leído por mpinedag
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 5. Enlisting mortgage bankers and subprime lenders in affordable housing 5:10 Leído por mpinedag
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 6. The community reinvestment act 22:13 Leído por mpinedag
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - IV. Conclusion 2:37 Leído por mpinedag